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1. Introduction 
   
“Oh my God, he stabbed me! Please help me! Please help me!”  were presumably the last words of Kitty 
Genovese before she died in a horrific crime with numerous passive witnesses (Gansberg 1964). On 
March 13, 1964, 21-years old Kitty Genovese was returning home from work 03:15 am in the morning.  
Having parked her car, she was attacked by a 29 old man Winston Moseley, who stabbed her two times 
in the back. When Kitty screamed for help, to no avail, Moseley fled. Later, he returned in his car and 
found the wounded woman in the hallway of an apartment building. Moseley stabbed Kitty again and 
killed her, before raping her. During these two episodes, about 38 people witnessed parts of the crime,  
but no one rushed to help the dying woman, and only few called the police. While later studies indicate 
that the number was exaggerated, and probably few, if any, were aware that they were witnessing a 
homicide (many thought it was a brawl or a quarrel between two drunken lovers) (Manning; Levine; 
Collins 2007). The murder of Kitty Genovese (Wispe 1981, p. 208) nonetheless caught the attention of 
medias, psychologists and social scientists. Particularly one type of behaviour was puzzling: bystanders’  
passive reactions when witnessing a crime (Knickerbocker 2003), later known as the ‘bystander effect’ .  
With psychologists and sociologists realising the need to examine human nature and the significance of 
helping other people (Wispe 1981), prosociality originated in psychology in the 1970s focussing on 
voluntary actions that benefit other people or society as a whole, such as helping, sharing, donating, co-
operating and volunteering (Wispe 1972; Latane & Darley 1970; Macaulay & Berkowit 1970; Bar-Tal 
1976; Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg 1977; Eisenberg 1982). The interest in doing research on prosocia l ity 
has later caught on in different branches of neuroscience. Especially, social neuroscience has had a 
significant role - examining neural mechanisms of prosocial behaviour like empathy (Sambo, et al.  2010; 
Singer & Lamm, 2009; Singer, et al. 2004). The focus of this explanation model is to quant itatively 
measure and visualize the neural structures that is thought to activate prosocial behaviours like empathy 
(as an object among other objects) by relating one level of organisation; the social to the neural level 
(Berntson et al. 2012). Social neuroscience thereby seeks to give ‘hard science’ answers to questions 
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about human behaviour. The explanation models of neuroscience have become so popular that there 
even is talk about a Neuro Revolution. (Slaby 2010, p. 398). Studies show that neuroscientifi c 
information is perceived by the public to provide good explanations of human behaviour because 
people find them intuitively satisfying, regardless of whether they are relevant for the explanation 
(Weisberg et al. 2008). The successful development of social neuroscience related to prosocial 
behaviour calls for a thorough philosophical analysis.  
In this respect, various philosophers and sociologists have tried to explain why some scientific 
disciplines from a societal perspective, besides scientific merits, are more successful than others 
(Timmermans & Berg 2003; Taylor 1985a). Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has argued, the 
modern is dominated by a ‘paradigm of clarity and objectivity’ that gives objective sciences moulded after the 
natural science model and mathematical calculus (like neuro physiological theories, theories of economy 
and social science) profound credibility as these explanatory models offer a luring sense of security, and 
the belief that we (at least in theory) can control and manipulate the world we live in (Taylor 1985a). 
However, following Taylor, such theories ignores that humans are defined by self-understandings that 
depends on subject referring properties, and therefore often ends up with an unreflective and rigid 
description of human behaviour (Taylor 1985b). In this light, various philosophers and neuroscientists 
in cognitive science have criticised the enterprise of neuroscience. A central meta -critique implied in 
this position is, that neuroscience provides reductionist explanations of human behaviour (Bennett & 
Hacker 2003; Bickle 2003) that are alien to how we understand our own actions as human beings. 
Contrary, to this critical position, prominent sociologists like Nikolas Rose suggest that the 
psychological space of Descartes’ mind-body problem, between body and behaviour, is flattened out in 
neuroscience. This creates a somatic individual and a new perspective of a neurochemical self (2001,  p.  
3).  
This paper looks at these discussions in relation to social neuroscience studies on prosocial behaviour.  
How does the development in social neuroscience studies on prosocial behaviour affect our 
understanding of prosocial behaviour, and is there a new way to explain these two seemingly conflicting 
views? Is it from a philosophical perspective possible to give a general account of social neuroscience 
studies on prosocial behaviour in light of the discussion of reductionism and societal interactions with 
neuroscience? 
With a hermeneutic starting point in the philosophy of science, the purpose of this paper is to examine,  
whether social neuroscience's epistemological ideas and use of neuro imaging technologies, 
methodologies and experimental designs on a more general level resonate a modern thought and 
cultures paradigm of clarity and objectivity as presented by Taylor? (1985a; 1985b). In doing this, I 
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argue, that while social neuroscience in the eyes of the public seem to produce a securing picture of 
clarity and objectivity; it is in fact a normative and murky enterprise.  
The paper thus uses Taylor's conceptual framework, and explores and evaluates the ongoing 
discussions and accusations of social neuroscience being reductionist, and inadequate to explain normal 
human behaviour (Bennett & Hacker 2003). This is contrasted with Rose's thesis of the neurochemical 
self. Where prosocial behaviour previous was mapped onto a psychological level, it is argued that 
biological psychiatry of neuroscience maps out empathy in our body - the human brain - in a new 
neurochemical self that is very different from the way our modern society's culture traditionally 
understands self-concepts and human behaviour in a psychological dimension, and does not coordinate 
or interact with these traditional understandings. 
I suggest this reductive explanation model creates an ‘autistic’ understanding of prosocial behaviour 
that challenges Taylor’s hermeneutic self, and puts our common self-understandings in a limbo. This 
explains some of the critique of neuroscience structures reducing the psychological dimension of 
human behaviour as a difference in perspectives and lack of coordination between levels. Through 
Taylors framework the article suggest an ontology with multiple levels.  
 While, autism in general terms traditionally is defined as a mental disorder that makes people unable to 
communicate properly, or to form relationships (Bullon 2007, p. 85), autistic in this article’s context 
means that neuroscientists’ methodological focus on structural details excludes the experience 
dependent properties of the prosocial behaviours they examine – and any coordination with our 
ordinary understanding of these and human behaviour in general.  
Sorting out the nuts and bolts of this development, this paper makes an important contribution to 
future discussions of philosophy and social neuroscience studies on prosocial behaviour in cognitive 
science. Showing that social neuroscience when describing possible causes of prosocial behaviour still 
has a lot of interpretation work to do in the translation of the language of neuroscience to laypersons 
understanding of human behaviour and psychology, when they promote and inform the public about 
prosocial behaviour. But, first, we begin with the birth of prosociality.  
 
2. The history of prosociality 
 
The earliest works on prosocial behaviour were before 1960 (Hartshore et al. 1929; Murphy 1937). 
However, social scientists first really began to use the term prosociality in the 1970’s (Latane & Darley 
1970; Macaulay & Berkowit 1970; Bar-Tal 1976; Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg 1976) as a reaction to prior 
studies' focus on aggressive behaviour due to increased stories about violence and crime (Bar-Tal 1976,  
p. 4). Lauren Wispe, thus, coined the phrase prosociality in 1972, as an antonym to antisocial behaviour 
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in her study “Positive forms of social behavior”. Prosociality represented ‘positive’ aspects of social 
behaviour such as: altruism, helping, trust and tolerance as opposed to ‘negative’ aspects of social 
behaviour, for example: aggression, egoism, competition and lying etc., described as anti -social 
behaviour (p. 203). There even is a journal that focuses on prosociality Journal of Social Issues (Eisenberg 
1982, p. 3), and prosociality is a concept still in the making. Altruism and altruistic psychosocial factors, 
like empathy, are connected with prosocial behaviour as key elements, but not the same. Where 
altruism refers to helping others without regards to benefits, a prosocial act refers to actions that 
benefit others. An action can, thus, be prosocial, but not altruistic, if the motive, for example,  is egoistic 
(Eisenberg et al. 2007). Today, prosociality has evolved into a variety of branches such as social 
psychology, behavioural genetics, development psychology, personality theory, industrial and 
organizational psychology, neuroeconomics and social neuroscience (Penner et al. 2005, p. 14.21). As 
this paper will show, especially social neuroscience has had immense influence on the current 
development of prosociality.  
In the following section, it is suggested that social neuroscience's use of experimental design and 
statistic analyses (Sambo, et al. 2010; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Singer, et al. 2004) echoes a modern 
thought and cultures paradigm of objectivity and clarity, expressed in a natural science model of 
objectivity and the prestige of mathematical calculus (Taylor 1985b). It is further argued, that the socia l  
element of social neuroscience (prosocial behaviours) is transformed to an independent static object 
with unchangeable causal properties that ignores that human behaviour change and might influence 
theory.  
 
3. Studies on prosociality resonate a modern paradigm of clarity and objectivity  
 
Traditionally a branch of biology, neuroscience is now an interdisciplinary discipline with collaborations 
between, chemistry, computer science, engineering, linguistics mathematics, medicine together with 
physics, psychology and philosophy. With a massive and generally positive public interest in brain 
research (Racine et al. 2010), sub disciplines like social neuroscience appeared in the early 19 90s and has 
since evolved in an impressive enterprise that examines how biological systems put social behaviour 
into practicei. Using biological concepts and methods, social neuroscience informs and refines social 
theories of social and human behaviours, often focussing on prosocial behaviours like empathy, care 
and cooperation (Decety & Cacioppo 2011, p. 3, 5). These advancing technologies have made it 
possible to study social and emotional stimuli more directly by tracking brain activity, especia l ly those  
stimuli that are activated when we care for other people’s wellbeing, like sympathy for pain (Lamm et 
al. 2011). As Nikolas Rose points out in The Politics of Life Itself, biological psychiatry constitutes not only 
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what counts as an explanation, it constitutes what there is to explain (2007, p. 192). But, though studies 
show evidence for a connection between empathy and prosociality, an empirical demonstration of a 
link between empathy and prosocial behaviour has still not been proven (Singer & Lamm 2009).  While, 
it is indicated that the way social neuroscience (often unconsciously), shapes the content of the 
concept’s ‘social’ term, is part of social neuroscience's success that brings with it a whole new 
understanding of the human self and behaviour. As we proceed, it should become clear, this is also its 
Achilles heel. 
 
3. 1 Charles Taylor – Man as a self-interpreting animal  
 
One way to elucidate this in a contrastive fashion is Charles Taylor’s (1985a) famous hermeneutic 
description of man as a self-interpreting animal with strong and weak evaluations in Self-interpreting 
animals. Here Taylor puts his philosophical anthropology in continuation of Heidegger’s Daseinanalyti cs  
(1953). The self relates to itself, and is always interpreting itself. But, even though the self relates to 
itself in a reflective way, it never seems to be able to get behind the understanding and objectify it .  As 
humans' our feelings are always confronted with some subjective (sensations) of what it means to be 
human, and what is qualitatively important to us. Taylor states that our feelings always are connected to 
certain articulations. These interpretations are not optional, but an essential part of being human.  Our 
self- and mis-understandings form what we feel. It is in this way, that man is a self-interpreting animal 
that always relates reflective and interpreting to his/her self and life (2007, p. 134). If we put prosocia l  
behaviour into Taylor's conceptual context, an adequate understanding of emotions like empathy would 
therefore demand a hermeneutic interpretation. According to Taylor, this field of interpretations pose a  
huge challenge when describing human behaviour in behavioural sciences that collide with a modern 
‘paradigm of clarity and objectivity’ (1985a, p. 45).  
 
3. 2 The paradigm of clarity and objectivity 
 
Taylor, thus, describes one of the reasons for the success of sciences moulded after the natural science 
model and mathematical calculations as modern thought and cultures  'paradigm of clarity and objectivity'. 
To paraphrase Taylor, the paradigm demands that we think clearly and objectively about something in 
order to reach a truth about an object among other objects. In line with social neuroscience, thinking 
objectively is here conceived as abstaining from associating or describing properties to the object that 
are subjective. Taylor calls these experience-dependent properties (1985a, p. 45-46). There, thus, is a 
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distinction between primary and secondary properties, where the last are ‘unscientific’ in the sense tha t  
they are subjective, and therefore incompatible with the 'paradigm of clarity and objectivity' (ibid. p. 45-46). 
As we move on, it should become clear that social neuroscience's explanations of behaviour also are 
shaped by a 'paradigm of clarity and objectivity' similar to a natural science ideal. An ideal that in the public 
brings with it the prestige of a science that appears to provide theoretical truth. According to Taylor, 
this prestigious objective outlook has resulted in reductive explanation models of human actions and 
experiences in physiological, materialistic and chemical terms (1985a, p. 47). This is most notable in the 
dominance of the natural science ideal of objectivity and mathematical thinking and other forms of 
formal calculus in the development of modern Western society and sciences like social sciences (and 
psychology) (Taylor 1985b). We find support for this claim in Trust In Numbers, where Theodore M. 
Porter argues that use of controlled clinical trials and medical statistics became the standard for medical 
evaluation of therapies. While, I think, the motives are multiple and complex, a key reason was, 
according to Porter, the march of medical statistics in the twentieth century. This redefined fields like 
medicine, psychology, agriculture, ecology, economics, sociology and biological and social disciplines, 
and provided a democratic openness and a public quantified demonstration of results  (1995, p. 203 -
204). In this line, statistical analyses are an integrated element in social neuroscience studies. Arguments 
based on formal calculus appear convincing in our Western culture, says Taylor. It shows in the 
undeserved dominance theories; based on the natural science ideal and formal calculus, have in social 
science (1985b). In this respect, Weisberg et al. (2008), argue that neuroscience is very popular in the 
public eye. Their study shows that explanations of psychological phenomena’s that include 
neuroscientific explanations bring with them much prestige, and are viewed as more satisfying  by non-
experts. These explanation models give people the impression of providing a good explanation of 
human behaviour, even if the neuroscientific information is irrelevant to the explanation. Similar, 
Prozac was not successful because it was more effective than other drugs, but as a smart drug, it 
purported to give a targeted treatment on a single neurotransmitter system without all the side -effects 
of older anti-depressants like benzodiazepines. Providing a sense of strategically control (Rose 2001,  p.  
5-6). In this light, Taylor’s 'paradigm of clarity and objectivity' is consistent with public support for 
neuroscientific research (Racine 2010). In accordance with this paradigm, the prestige of ‘objectifying’ 
sciences and their quantification/(objectification) of human behaviours (wherein we can categorize 
social neuroscience studies) seems to be the closest we get a paradigm of ‘objective’ knowledge about 
human behaviours like empathy (1985b). Whether the success of social neuroscience today is 
undeserved is more questionable, and not a discussion I want to go into in this article.  
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While, I have tried to show that experimental social neuroscience studies on prosociality echo a 
'paradigm of clarity and objectivity' , I think, the picture and the consequences still are somewhat vague. 
However, as we proceed, and examine how theories of social neuroscience interact, or does not 
interact, with man and change our self-understandings, my suggestions ought to become clear. This will 
enable us to understand the critique of reductionism from a new perspective. Next, we therefore 
examine how neuroscience's explanation model influences our understanding of prosocial behaviour in 
connection to the 'paradigm of clarity and objectivity' , using Taylor and Bennett & Hacker's outline on 
neuroscience. With Taylor's outline on 'brute data', it is argued that social neuroscience ignores 
experience-dependent properties like shame, meanings and intentions because they would break with 
the 'paradigm of clarity and objectivity'. While there might be some elements of redundancy in their 
arguments, together they make a strong case for the importance experience-dependent properties play 
in our (psychological) understanding of human action and behaviour, and why 'objectivistic' approaches 
in sciences of man like social neuroscience struggle with these properties. In this respect, I show that 
our ordinary understanding of normal human behaviour is non-reductive, in the sense that we 
understand an agent's action through interpreting factors like purpose, intentions and norms. Bennett 
& Hacker argue it seems inconceivable that we could get a deeper understanding of such events by 
referring to neural brain activity. However, I suggest that in cases of pathological or abnormal 
behaviour, social neuroscience purport to provide an objective account of possible mental disorders 
with a scientific approach that paradoxical also are a result of a variety of negotiations. I argue that 
social neuroscience in this way unconsciously defines prosocial behaviour as the norm, the normal, by 
referring to its antonym, antisocial and pathological behaviour. This is done with an objectivistic 
approach whose use of 'brute data' so far has been inconceivable with our ordinary understanding of 
how actions and feelings are defined by personal judgements and perceptions. Introducing Nikolas 
Rose's definition of a neurochemical self, attempts are made to nuance the discussion, by suggesting a 
difference of perspectives. In relation to pro-social behaviour, I examine how neuroscience's 
quantitative description of neural brain activity, according to Rose, creates a new neurochemical self 
that operates in the body – the human brain - and guided by a ‘paradigm of clarity and objectivity’ , rewrites 
human experiences (psychological phenomena) to intersubjective (scientific) ‘brute data’ 
(neuroscientific phenomena), and - according to this paper - challenges Taylor's hermeneutic thesis 
'human beings are self-interpreting animals' with self-understandings (1985a, p. 45). However, contrary to 
Taylor's account, some scientists suggest that we are beginning to understand the social through the 
biological in cases, where the social can be translated to neural activation. I argue that in spite of the  
prestige of social neuroscience and the neurochemical self, in our culture we still do not understand 
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ourselves, our moods, feelings and intentions through a neurobiological language, but through a 
psychological self-interpretive self like that of Taylor's. Introducing an autism metaphor, I explicate this 
and show that the neurochemical self seems to provide an autistic understanding of prosocial 
behaviour. To clarify the difference of perspectives and levels, we introduce philosopher Erich 
Klawonn’s (1942-2011) fierce defence of dualism.  
 
4. Brute data of psychology and neuroscience ignores experience-dependent properties 
 
Following Taylor, scientific attempts to describe man with a background in an objectivistic orientation 
have entailed a reductive explanation model of human actions, behaviours and feelings (1985a,  p.  47).  
In Peaceful Coexistence In Psychology, Taylor exemplifies the paradigm with the term ‘brute data’ (ibid). 
Following this objectivistic perspective, science should only use univocal and intersubjective data.  Any 
potential observer should be able to use ‘brute data’ without making any subjective interpretation or 
judgement of it. Physical parameters are ideal as ‘brute data’ because they are easy to identify. A 
hypothesis can then be settled by observing how an interpretation-free object interacts in an 
experimental situation. This makes it possible to reach a collective agreement among scientist, giving 
science an, “…impressive show of objectivity…” (1985a, p. 117). Although Taylor's outline is from 1971, and 
therefore outdated in terms of how neuroscience has evolved since then, his notion of 'brute data' is 
still highly relevant as it touches upon the dilemmas of describing human behaviour adequately in an 
objective account without using experience-dependent properties, or, what we could call, the 
psychological dimension of man. Technologies like Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and 
Electroencephalography (EEG) are therefore used to make observations more accurate and detailed in 
social neuroscience by quantitatively measuring and visualizing perceived empathy, as an example,  for 
pain through brain activity (Lamm et al. 2011). Instead of hermeneutic approaches, like the Freudian 
interpretation of the patient’s voice and biography, brain imaging shows differences in regions of the 
‘normal’ brain from the ‘schizophrenic’ brain, and provide a new objectivity (Rose 2007, p. 9). 
However, as Matusall points out (2012, p. 62), we need to be aware that technologies like MRI neuro 
imaging not are neutral representations of the brain, but results of sociotechnological relations: "the 
constraints of hard- and software, historical developments and negotiations between developers and applicants of the 
technology." The 'objective' perspective of prosocial behaviour seems radical different than our self-
understandings and ordinary way of understanding and talking about behaviour. In this light, to 
paraphrase Taylor, there are two aspects of our ordinary accounts of human behaviour, which 
neurophysiological explanations struggle with. First, because human behaviour is teleological it 
describes our behaviour in terms of purpose, bent and desires. Second, it is also intentional as our 
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behaviour is understood by the meaning things have for a subject, his/her self and the environment - 
herein reside experience-dependent properties like shame. We are normally content with these forms of 
explanations as they resonate behaviour to, how a 'normal' person acts in our society. However, these 
ordinary accounts of human behaviour vary in different cultures and milieus, which makes it hard to 
use them unambiguously and intersubjectively in a neurophysiological explanation model (1985a, p. 
165, 167).  
 
4. 1 Experience-dependent properties and the story of the Good Samaritan 
 
While, we might think that the experience-dependent properties/emotions of Taylor (1985b p. 57) only 
fare with self-concerned emotions like shame they can also arise in situations, where we not are 
concerned with the self but for the wellbeing of another person. From Taylor’s perspective, the parable 
of the Good Samaritan is about feeling an obligation to help, not because we could somehow benefit 
from acting prosocial, or be 'for' being 'social' (that is, prosocial as some sort of extra dimension of 
life), but because we feel a call to help the person lying in front of us. While, reasons for actions here 
are subject referring or experience-dependent, they are not egoistic. While, we might be struck by self -
regarding emotions: ‘this will make me look good’, following Taylor's reasoning, our real motivation to 
help is not a prosocial desire (in any strategic sense) to help this person, who has fallen of her bicycle. 
We may even not feel a desire to help, but wish to do something else, and leave the wounded person as 
the priests choose to do in the parable. However, oftentimes we realize that these egoistic reasons are ill 
timed as this is not some sort of game, but the needs of another person that matters, and who is 
dependent on us. We feel this obligation as a sensible/rational and moral being (Rose 2013, p. 146), 
and realise that this obligation is ours, and we have to rise to the occasion (Taylor 2007). According to 
Taylor, there thus is an inevitable moral dimension connected with subjectivity, where we seem 
destined to be moral animals. From an Aristotelian viewpoint, Taylor thinks that an essential part of 
being human is having orientations towards the good life. In this process, our feelings help us realise 
what the good life is (1985a, p. 65).  
 
4. 2 Explanations of reasoned actions are non-reductive 
 
Let us revise one of Taylor's examples (1985a, p. 120), and try to elaborate the characteristics 
neuroscience struggles with in light of reductionism. By reductionist, I mean: the belief that human 
behaviour can be explained by reference to interactions of nerve cells and molecules. In our ordinary 
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understanding of human conduct, we identify an action by knowing the purpose it aims to achieve. 
Mostly this identification is straightforward. A girl asks you, if she can turn on the light in a dim room. 
You see the girl flip the light switch, and naturally, in agreement with her question, reasons that she 
wants to turn on the light, because the room is dim. According to Bennett & Hacker's critical outline in 
Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience (2003) this type of explanation is non-reductive, in that it refers to 
various factors and presupposes our knowledge of social practices and conventions, such as turning on 
the light. Following Bennett & Hacker's reasoning, it would be meaningless to think that we cou ld 
come to a deeper and more adequate explanation of, why she turned on the light by adding a reductive 
neural explanation model measuring brain activity. Neural patterns in brain activity have no logical 
consequences to what we psychological believe of something. According to Bennett & Hacker, a neural 
configuration cannot show the truth of a proposition to be right or wrong (ibid. p. 361-362). If we want 
to get a deeper understanding of what is going on, we have to ask the girl, why she turned on the ligh t? 
The explanation will need to provide her reasons for turning on the light. These explanations refer to 
multitudes of familiar, but complex moral, social and legal conventions (Bennett & Hacker 2003). Quite 
unexpected, she tells, she is unable to relax before the switch is in alignment with the other switches on 
the wall. With the new explanation of purpose, we need to make a new description of the act. Here 
knowing the purpose of the action is crucial if we want to get an adequate understanding of the 
situation (Taylor 1985a). Taylor therefore reasons, that we often need to understand the intention of an 
agent in order to know the actions. With the girl, we might question her reasoning and try to explain 
the irrationality of her actions. We might come to an agreement, where we are able to somehow 
understand how important, albeit illogical, the position of the light switch is and we might not. In the 
last case, we are stranded on different judgements, and we cannot seek other criteria’s than those of an 
interpretive dispute. So, while there still are criteria’s they rely on our insight into certain matters and 
our judgment of the situation. Following this outline, we cannot step out of this domain of 
interpretations (Taylor 1985a, p. 121). In continuation, Bennett & Hacker argue, we do not explain 
human behaviour by referring to neurons, but by referring to situational context and asking for reasons 
and judging the validity of these in light of the situation. These reasons may refer to a variety of human 
goods that lead to actions or refer to context related social or cultural norms that permit or forbid 
certain forms of behaviour for certain kinds of people: “No amount of neuroscience can explain why Henry 
VII could not divorce Catherine of Aragon without papal permission” (p. 364). However, Bennett & Hacker 
acknowledge that in special cases, where abnormal behaviour comes to force we can seek to understand 
behaviour by measuring brain activity, which would give a descriptive explanation in terms of offering 
evidence for a possible mental disorder.  
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Actually, it turns out the girl has obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Indications of OCD can be 
measured using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) (Milad & Rauch 2012), which provide a visual and 
quantified explanation of brain activity for possible neural indications for why she is unable to relax 
before the switch is in alignment with the other switches (Taylor 1985a, p. 119, 123). However, in order 
to know what Kitty is doing, when she screams for help, we need to know what it means to be a 
human being and to feel fear, and how it can come about. Through neuroscience, we can learn a lot 
about abnormal neural activity in Moseley's brain, should he have a mental disorder. Neuroscience 
explains such behaviour through neurotransmitters in the brain that cause an anomaly in moods or 
conduct (Rose 2001, p. 4). Neuroscience is quite remarkable at describing pathological behaviour and 
how we psychological can be prone and responsible for temperaments (Bennett & Hacker, p 366). 
However, in order to understand why Moseley did what he did on a personal level, he would have to go 
through therapy, and a psychologist would have to learn about his life story, upbringing, etc. And we 
might examine how mental diseases alienate people (Erdner et al. 2005). Besides Moseley’s possible 
mental disorder, a neuroscientific reductive neural explanation of brain activity does not improve forms 
of explanation in the domain of human social, moral and legal life, should we follow Bennett & 
Hacker’s reasoning (p. 363, 366). Yet, as French philosopher and physician Georges Canguilhem has 
shown in The Normal and the Pathological, we often define the normal and learn to understand the normal 
by referring to the pathological and abnormal (1991, p. 138). From this perspective it seems reasonable 
that prosocial behaviour often is understood in connection to antisocial behaviour, and the 
development of for example new drugs like SSRI's for pathological behaviour such as different anxiety 
disorders: Social Anxiety Disorders, Panic Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder etc., and the 
marketing strategies that fare with the development. Thus, SSRI drugs seek to emulate pro-social 
behaviours such as empathy, kindness and happiness that in a prescriptive manner are being defined by 
its opposite, anti-social behaviours.  
Taylor accepts that, we might be able to make reductive explanations of feelings on a 
neurophysiological level. Thus, Taylor in Self-interpreting animals from 1977 (1985a) acknowledges that it  
in principle would be possible to describe causal reasons in a human that feels fear through computers 
and sensors that register patterns of recognition and facts about feeling fear. However, following 
Taylor, we would possess a structural analogy to fear, herein the recognition of ‘meaning’ and escape, 
but we would lack the specific qualitative description of that particular feeling of fear connected to a 
subject’s consciousness as these would be considered concomitant phenomenon's. While, the model 
seems to work in connection to a physical threat, it does not work with something like shame. 
Remembering the aspects a neurophysiological explanation model struggles with, this is because the 
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data in psychology (or our ordinary understandings of human behaviour) is of a unique kind. 
Psychology uses phenomena's like feelings and actions that are characterized by the thoughts, images 
and intentions of those subjects that produces these phenomena's. Taylor calls some of these subject -
referring properties. It is emotions like shame, integrity and dignity, which are neither strictly objective 
nor just subjective because they rely on, what Taylor calls, certain import-ascriptions. So in an objective 
explanation model, experience-dependent emotions like shame cannot be generalized, since shame is 
dependent of particular cultures imports, which is a context related evaluation of how a situation is  (ibid. 
p. 51-53, 55). What is important for a person in one culture may not have the same meaning in another 
culture. Furthermore, shame is not always a rational feeling; it can be quite irrational and have an 
illogical presence. In this regard, language is decisive as it articulates our feelings and thereby our sense 
of related imports, and thus changes the feeling (Taylor 1985a, p. 70-71). Even though, I rationally 
know that I should not be ashamed of my ‘terrible’ dialect - the shame is still real, as it collides with 
how I wish to present myself. That is because the import-recognition of a shameful condition is related 
to a subject, me, for whom it has significance. Furthermore, an acceptance of experience-dependent 
properties like shame in experimental psychology and neurophysiological explanation models would 
break the paradigm of objectivity. While actions and feelings thus, following Taylor’s point of view, to a 
certain extent are defined by experience-dependent judgements, perceptions and emotions, where some 
(like shame) are irreducible to judgements about ‘brute data’ (1985a, p. 122), social neuroscience on the 
other hand, offer reductive explanations on a more basic level that in cases of abnormal neural brain 
activity (like OCD) provide indications for why some people tend to act in a certain way. Following 
Taylor's view it seems subject-referring properties like shame does not fit into an objective worldview 
as they describe properties that relate to the meaning things have for people, which an objective model 
(like neuroscience) does not acknowledge. However, as we shall see, elaborating on Taylor's outline, 
disagreements might be a question of different perspectives, and different levels.  
 
4. 3 The neurochemical self defines prosocial behaviour 
 
We have just learned social neuroscience's understanding of man and human behaviour is radical 
different from the interpretive perspective of Taylor's hermeneutic self, because social neuroscience 
relies on ‘brute data’ in the shape of neurochemicals and neurones. As Nikolas Rose (2007, p. 188) 
points out, where human behaviour previous was mapped out on a psychological level (lik e Freud's 
psychoanalysis or a more general account, man as self-interpreting), they are now mapped out on the 
human body – the brain. With neuroscience, we therefore need to understand behaviour in a whole 
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new register, where we have become neurochemical selves, says Rose (2007, p. 188). Rose argues this 
new enterprise brings new norms of behaviour that operates on another level than the psychological 
dimension. Instead, of using language and interpretation, social neuroscience's descriptive approach 
seeks the social through observation and measurement of synapses and neurotransmitters (Matusall 
2012, p. 4). According to Matusall (2012, p. 67), this constitutes a conceptual shift in how we 
understand human behaviour and relations to the social and the biological. Now it is possible to 
understand the social in the biological as long as the social can be translated into neural activation.  To 
paraphrase Matusall, how aspects of the social world influence behaviour and biology have little interest 
in social neuroscience as they are thought as being insignificant to the basic development, structures 
and processes of the brain and human behaviour (Matusall 2012, p. 4). What seems to be of interest is,  
how we can explain the role environments and experiences play in anti-social behaviour through 
impacts in the brain (Rose 2007, p. 220). 
Taylor accepts different levels of explanations that use languages with a different logic than the 
teleological and intentional explanations of our ordinary life. However, he argues, while the logic of the 
two languages - between our ordinary explanation of actions and a neurophysiological explanation is 
very different - it, nonetheless, does not preclude making a reduction from one theory to another. 
Although, a neurophysiological account would not have concepts like 'want' or 'shame', it could have 
"connecting propositions such as 'the state Px is the state of the CNS which corresponds to what we call "wanting 
peanuts"'" (1985a p. 173). Because human beings are physical objects, they have to comply with the laws 
of physics and chemistry. If any kind of reductionism is true, then higher levels of explanations like 
psychological or sociological should be explainable on lower neurophysiological levels in terms of 
physics and chemistry. Although, a neuroscientific explanation would be a more basic theory on a 
neural level, it ideally should be able to fill in the gaps in our ordinary explanations of human actions 
(the social level) by motive. While, Taylor (ibid. pp. 167, 174, 181) sees such theories as potentia l  riva l 
theories, Bennett & Hacker argue that neuroscientific explanations not are in competition or conflict 
with explanations of normal behaviour guided by intentions, goals and purposes, because it is 
impossible to reduce such explanations to a neuroscientific account (p. 366). Nonetheless, Taylor 
argues, the mechanistic explanations of a neurophysiological account needs to be restricted so it 
coordinates with our everyday account - in order to 'save the phenomena'. Even so, it would most likely 
often upset our ordinary perceptions, but in a way so it still supports, " the logic of our ordinary language of 
feeling, action and desire" (1985a p.174). In other words, while a neuroscientific explanation of prosocial 
behaviour might differ radically from our ordinary account of behaviour, following Taylor, it would 
somehow have to resonate in general with the logic of our everyday experience of the subject of study,  
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and our ordinary language of feelings, actions and desires. Berntson et al. (2012, p. 70-71) calls this 
calibrative reductionism, and present social neuroscience as an example of a method that tries to map 
out behaviour across multiple levels - but (in correspondence with the 'paradigm of objectivity and clari ty' )  
with the reservation that subject-referring properties/emotions are left out. However, while Taylor 
seems to make our ordinary understanding of human behaviour a first priority, whereto neuroscience 
should coordinate their descriptions so as to 'save the phenomena', Berntson et al. give no priority to 
one level over another. Hence, the ideal goal of social neuroscience as an interdisciplinary science 
would be to calibrate knowledge and theories with other levels - and produce multilevel and 
interdisciplinary understandings of phenomena's. Ideally, this calibration among levels would be a 
reciprocal multilevel configuration. As an example, Berntson et al. mention a study on amphetamine, 
where the drugs effect on primate behaviour was examined. It was first when the primate's  position in 
the social hierarchy was included that a pattern was formed. Showing primates that were high in the 
social hierarchy would become more dominant with amphetamine, while primates that were low in the 
social hierarchy would become more submissive in their behaviour.  
While, Taylor states that it most likely would be impossible to capture the essence of experience -
dependent properties like shame, we should aim to coordinate a neurophysiological account with these 
properties. He seems to think that neurophysiological theories (neuroscience) should be able to make 
these distinctions by including more levels. Following Taylor’s line of thought, methods in social 
neuroscience (MRI, EEG) would therefore: "have to be rich enough to mark the major distinctions of all the 
varied cultures. (...) For a neurophysiological short-cut which by-passed cultural differences would make nonsense of a great 
part of the descriptions men use to speak of themselves"  (1985a, p. 178). An adequate neuroscience would 
presumably struggle - but should quite paradoxical try - to include the ‘unscientific’ description of 
feelings like empathy (our language of emotions), intentional and teleological concepts, and thereby the 
description of man’s psychological dimension when informing science about human behaviour (Taylor 
2007, p. 119-120), and thus interfere with the 'paradigm of objectivity and clarity'. According to Taylor, such 
a theory would not be reductive and rich enough to explain people's self-understandings and able to 
indicate the key distinctions of the varied human cultures (p. 178). Hence, Taylor (2007, p. 123) 
maintains, there are truths about the subjective sphere, which cannot be reduced to an objective 
ontology without including the psychological dimension. We could try to explain behaviour by 
measuring serotonin levels in our brains, and refer to them as possible causes of prosocial beha viour. 
However, from Taylor’s outlook, we would need to incorporate the major distinctions of our culture 
and self-understandings, otherwise social neuroscience would run the risk of providing a rigid 
explanation of behaviour that puts our common self-understandings (herein empathy understood as 
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and experience dependent emotion) in a limbo, because the explanation does not relate to the situation 
in a meaningful way, neither does it coordinate between levels, nor does it explain reasons for acting.  
So, while both Taylor and Berntson et al. reason that multiple levels are possible, and we get the most 
adequate understanding of behaviour if these levels interact and there is coordination between them, 
Taylor argues, we ideally should strive after a non-reductive neurophysiological explanation that 
includes experience-dependent properties. Instead, Berntson et al. (2012) excludes these descriptions. 
However, as Berntson et al. suggests, social neuroscience's mapping out prosocial behaviour also 
creates a potential alienating gap of non-understanding, if there is lack of coordination between the 
different levels of the explanation models of social neuroscience and our ordinary self-understanding of 
behaviour.  
To better understand the complexity - the two self's and their different ways of understanding human 
behaviour - consider a map analogy. We can illustrate social neuroscience's mapping out the human 
brain with mapping a new road in a road-building project, where the land surveyor, using GPS, 
measures the road with fixed points that afterwards is printed out on paper. Just by looking at the 
paper, the land surveyor knows that this is "Road-building project A3". To a layperson it is just lots of dots 
that makes no sense. Moving on, we add the fixed points to a landscape map. Now the layperson is 
able to see the dots in a larger context, and may suggest, the map illustrates some sort of building 
project. Then the land surveyor has the architect connect the fixed points with lines and lets him/her 
add descriptions. The layperson now reasons that this must be a drawing of a road-building project. 
However, it is first when the layperson sees the road project illustrated in a 3 -D drawing (or on a 
picture) that s/he gets a real understanding of what it all is about. But, even then, the layperson's 
understanding is not deep like that of the land surveyor. Similar, we live in a society, where a 
psychological understanding has evolved as a natural part of our culture, and where a neurochemical 
self appear as a new way of understanding man (Rose 2013, p. 221) that seems alien to our ordinary 
psychological way of understanding of human behaviour. Using a Taylorian terminology, we could cal l  
these maps of self-understandings. In alignment with the 'paradigm of clarity and objectivity', this 
neurochemical self offers a sense of control based on objective scientific knowledge, and thereby the 
impression that we can somehow readjust ourselves through chemicals when we are mentally out of 
balance in order to become the "real me". This real self is both "natural" and (in alignment with a 
natural science ideal) "produced". From the neurochemical perspective the biological is a new way of 
understanding the social. However, Rose argues, while it is possible for people to understand thei r 
behaviour and feelings through a neurobiological language, a psychological dimension still remains a 
fundamental way of understanding ourselves (Rose 2013, p. 212). This confirms our suggestions that 
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social neuroscience creates new self-understandings, which also provides explanations of behaviour 
that seem far from explanations of our ordinary life, because the psychological dimensions are 
excluded. Using Taylor's conceptual framework, a disanalogy emerges. Human behaviour is not an 
inanimate object and always changing. We do not understand man and prosocial behaviour by looking 
at the brain, like we understand the road by looking at the drawings. While the road-building map has 
to remain the same in order to describe the road adequately, the map of human behaviour is ever 
evolving - as our selves are continuously evolving. Roughly, we can say, where social neuroscience 
looks at the structure of human behaviour, they do not look at the content of these behaviours (such as 
judgment of reasons for behaviour through strong evaluations), and are therefore not good at 
describing normal behaviour. Like a person with autism, social neuroscience examines something (in 
this case pro- & anti-social behaviour) to the smallest detail - its very finest structures, but from a 
hermeneutic perspective, social neuroscientists' do not really provide (coordinate) an essential 
meaningful understanding of what it feels like to be empathic and act prosocial, because shaped by the 
prestigious 'paradigm of clarity and objectivity' they leave out the distinctive subject referring properties of 
prosocial behaviour, such as feelings and reasons for helping other people, which is what makes us 
understand behaviour as human beings. 
To elaborate the challenge of making reduction from one level to another lets us look at Eric 
Klawonn's defence of dualism. The purpose is not to go into a discussion about materialism vs. 
dualism; neither do I wish to defend dualism. However, I think, his description beautifully pictures how 
a hermeneutic self like that of Taylor's and the intrinsic nature of mental thoughts (and their distinctive 
experience-dependent emotions) differ compared to measuring and observing mental thoughts as 
psychical entities via brain activities in the biological neural network of the neurochemical self.  
 
4. 4 Klawonn: thoughts are strictly private  
 
According to Klawonn (1991), we can locate our dreams in the brain through neurons, while the 
dream, itself, exists in another perspective. The same goes for thoughts and feelings l ike empathy.  
Let me clarify this through a thought experiment. If we put a man in an MRI scanner with the 
instruction to look at another person who is subjected to pain (Singer et al. 2004), while he looks at a 
screen that monitors his brain activity, he most likely could state a thought of feeling empathy for the 
person suffering as being located certain places in the brain, marked with bright colourful areas. 
However, he would also know the neurophysiological representation on the screen as very different 
from his own empathic thought. As Roepstorff’s study indicates in this kind of cases (2007), just by 
looking at the colourful brain image, an experienced neuroscientist with no prior information about 
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what the participant is thinking can presumably interpret the brain activity in what is called the pain 
matrix: "the secondary somatosensory cortex (SII), insular regions, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the movement -
related areas such as the cerebellum and supplementary motor areas and, less robustly, the thalamus and the primary 
somatosensory cortex (SI)", which could indicate that this man presumably is in a possible vicarious 
response towards another person, like feeling empathy for pain (Singer et al. 2004, p. 1158). But, the 
scientist will not know what the specific thought is about, the quality or qualia of the thought. The 
thought will be what, Klawonn describes as, “strictly private”, (ibid. My translation, p. 7). While the 
physical reality, thus, in general is accessible for everyone the feeling of, for example, pain is never 
intersubjectively accessible, Klawonn reason. While, we thus can talk about pain as being a particular 
place in our body, we are not able to physically force our way into the thought: “The feeling of pa in is  not 
“in” the tooth, and the mind is not “in” the head in the same way as the coffee is in the cup. The dentist’s drill can expose 
an inflamed nerve, but the dentist has no access to the pain itself”  (ibid. p. 8). In the same way, with reference to 
Zahavi & Roepstorff's interesting article Faces and ascriptions: Mapping measures of the self  (2011, p. 142, 
147), they point out that the self has evolved into simplified versions in neuroscience. More theoretica l 
and conceptual versions of the self, such as its structures, function and nature has vanished or been 
ignored. Indeed, the notion of a self with a subjective consciousness is to some neuroscientists just an 
illusion created by the brain (Rose 2013, p. 200). However, putting Zahavi & Roepstorff's outl ine into 
perspective with Klawonn's description, we could also argue that the 'empathic self' is not in the brain 
as the coffee is in the cup. Hence, we might measure brain activity that indicates empathic behaviour, 
but following Klawonn's account, the scientists' have no access to empathy itself.  
   
5. Discussion 
 
To summarize, there thus seems to be two perspectives of the self with different self-understandings 
that operate on different levels and inform in different ways, and from a Taylorian perspective does not 
coordinate or interact with each other - as they until now have left out our ordinary life's interpretive 
self-understandings and their subject-referring properties/emotions. However, social scientists' 
perceives these as unscientific properties, and shows that in the case of primates it is possible to 
coordinate inter-subjectively by including the social hierarchy. This creates a void space between these 
understandings - where no transcending understandings reside. Where the hermeneutic self relates to 
the mind and our situated self-understandings (the girl's reasoning and interpretation) in a psychological 
dimension, the neurochemical self relates to the somatic – the body (the girl's brain activity and 
observation) (Rose 2001, p 3). Where the first describes how we feel and understand our selves in our 
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ordinary lived life with all its extraordinary experiences - the last accuses the first of being an illusion, 
providing another explanation that following Bennett & Hacker up till now seem far from how we 
understand normal human behaviour. A good way of illustrating this is using the autism analogy 
metaphor. Like the amygdala in patients with autism, according to studies, seems to be relative 
detached from the mechanisms that generate conscious feelings responses (Decety & Cacioppo 2011, 
p. 200), in a similar manner social neuroscience's account of prosocial behaviours like empathy from a 
Taylorian perspective does not coordinate their accounts with our ordinary understanding of behaviour 
in a way where we can relate the two, as they exclude experience-dependent properties/emotions, 
making "nonsense of a great part of the descriptions men use to speak of themselves"  (1985a, p. 178). Thus,  socia l  
neuroscience provides an autistic understanding of behaviour that is very different from our ordinary 
language and understanding of human behaviour. While carrying with it the prestigious mark of 
scientific objectivity, social neuroscience from a hermeneutic perspective, like that of Taylor's, brings 
with it an autistic understanding of behaviour (Singer et al. 2004) that actually undermines our ordinary 
practical understanding of these matters because it detaches itself from what it examines, and reduces 
human behaviour to an observable object, a neurochemical self, after a natural science model that tries 
to leave out human self-understandings – herein meanings, intentions. In other words, what motivates 
people for being empathic, what reasons they have for helping?  
They forget that prosocial actions often is motivated by feel ings, or to use Hume’s phrase 
“reason is a slave of the passions”. Reason alone cannot motivate our will to act prosocial, but is also 
dependent of our passions. Our moral distinctions are derived from our moral sentiments: feelings of 
approval disapproval etc. Providing reasons to act prosocial. 
Researchers within prosociality with their detailed knowledge, thus, fail to achieve a proper 
understanding of - what many think to be the essence of prosociality - empathy, because the 
dominating methodologies of social neuroscience studies on prosocial behaviour epistemologically 
doesn’t recognize the qualitative aspects of what it is examining; empathic behaviours. The paradox of 
this development is, it carries with it a tendency to bring about: ‘the more we know  the lesser we 
understand’, as it unravels new knowledge leave out an (ontological) ordinary humanistic 
understanding, because it so far have been unable to bridge the neuroscienctific level with the 
psychological level, as the hermeneutic interpretation work of self-understandings has been left out as 
unscientific. As with Hume’s critique of Kant ethics of duty, social neuroscience lacks the fundamental 
understanding of the reasons why people act prosocial. That is, understanding the experience depended 
properties that motivates people to act prosocial as it leaves out the passions that motivates people to 
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act prosocial, making the reasons for doing so a ‘Kantian duty’ ignoring the diverse underlying 
motivating feelings that makes us reason and act in reasonable ways. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As I have tried to show, social neuroscience constitutes a new neurochemical self that provides 
neuroscientific explanations that operate on a different level than our ordinary account of human 
behaviour. Social neuroscience have so far only to some extent tried to coordinate their accounts on 
prosocial behaviour inter-subjectively with the psychological dimension. While, calibrative reductionism 
in the future might be potential promising in explaining behaviour, using Taylor’s conceptual 
framework of Western societies and sciences governed by the 'paradigm of clarity and objectivity', 
epistemological I have tried to show that many social neuroscience studies from a psychological 
perspective bring about a reductionist explanatory model and conception of human behaviour that 
provides, what I described as an autistic understanding of human behaviour because it constitutes a 
new observational neurochemical self that, like an autistic person, omits the experience dependent 
properties of the behaviours it studies, and ignores that these always are constituted and transformed 
by human self-understandings as experienced and interpreted feelings. However, with Nikolas Rose’s 
notion of a neurochemical self this also seems to be a result of different perspectives. Where  human 
behaviour previous was described on a psychological level (like Freud's psychoanalysis, or that of 
Taylor's self-understandings), they are now mapped out on the human body – the brain. Nonetheless, 
as Rose reasons, we still understand ourselves as human beings through a psychological dimension. In 
this light, social neuroscientists have to develop theories - that epistemological rely less on an autistic 
understanding of human behaviour - and, to use Taylor's framework (1985b), become more 
'clairvoyant' and 'self-conscious' about practice and the underlying norms (of objectivity and clarity) 
that guide it.  
According to Taylor, such an account would have to rely on an ontology with different levels.  
However, it may be argued that social neuroscience already is conscious about practice. It is just 
another way of thinking about practice, where we are beginning to understand the social through the 
biological. It is the era of the neurochemical self - a new way of thinking - a new way of being 
conscious - a whole new epistemological map of understanding human behaviour that in time might 
change our ordinary self-understanding of human- and prosocial behaviour. However, from a 
hermeneutic (that is the psychological) perspective the enterprise of social neuroscience, thus, presents 
a (re) description of prosocial behaviours, like empathy, that lacks the hermeneutic work of 
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interpretation and realm of understanding, constituting a more observational and less-reflective self-
consciousness of its practice. According to Taylor, an adequate neuropsychology would be non-
reductive, in that intentional and teleological concepts would not be reducible to a more basis level. 
Enabling it to contain human interpretive self-understandings while social neuroscience operates i n an 
observational bodily dimension of structural descriptions. While, such a theory, according to Taylor, 
should be able to make the cultural distinctions there is no solid evidence that this has happened.  The 
self-understandings, that relate social neuroscience to how we live, act and feel as human beings, are 
missing. In this respect, social neuroscience's impressive enterprise still seems to have much 
interpretation work to do, if they are to inform theories of prosocial behaviour across disciplines in a 
fruitful way.  
 
While, viewpoints differ on human behaviours and how we should understand them epistemologically;  
most of us fell ill at ease when we read the story about Kitty Genovese. As human beings, we 
empathise and can in some way relate to the terrible situation of fearing for your life. Most of us,  thus,  
realize the importance of feelings like empathy, and we somehow share this understanding. We real ize 
the importance of feeling a commitment to help when we see another human being suffer, and we 
hope, that we rise to the occasion, like Taylor’s account on the Parable of the Good Samaritan, and that 
we don’t rationalise ourselves out of the situation like the priests did. We hope this, not because helping 
would benefit us should we end up in a similar situation, but because we naturally feel a call, an 
obligation to help another human being. At least, this is what Taylor’s philosophy tells us. The story of 
Kitty Genovese is another story. It is about not rising to the occasion, rationalising everything 
according to ones own good, and taking the same road as the priests.  
It is about not understanding behaviours as something, which we feel towards other people. In this 
relief the story of Kitty Genovese illustrates the paradoxical challenges that socia l neuroscience faces in 
the limelight of its seemingly perennial success. It doesn’t seem to understand behaviours on the level 
as something we feel, and thus seem alienated towards reasons for acting prosocial, because the 
enterprise has alienated its reasoning from the feelings and moral distinctions that motivates these 
actions empirical.    
While, we might be able to give a detailed account on stimuli and brain activity (and neuro imaging 
certainly will carry a lot of prestige in the public), it still does not relate to our life or society in a 
meaningful way, because stimuli does not give us an adequate description and deeper understanding of 
the psychological aspect – feelings like empathy and the importance of intention – and the qualitative 
meaning these behaviours have for us as human beings. Why, we from an ethical perspective should be 
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pro-social instead of ‘just’ social. In this respect, theories such as Taylor’s provide a promising account 
on, how we may understand prosocial behaviour as human interpreted behaviour that is self-reflective 
rather than strategic. Following Taylor, we all know that helping other beings is an obligation that 
cannot rest on animals, rocks or anti-social humans like Moseley, but only beings that have and 
experience subjective emotions with certain import-ascriptions that guides our moral compass. And, 
while we might be able to measure, whether feelings are of an empathic character, we can presumably 
never access the thoughts unique qualities, as they remain strictly private. 
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